Introduction

Research into the representations of the self  in the electronic communication environment has started almost simultaneouslywith the emergence of the environment itself. To designate such representations various terms beginning with “virtual have been used such as “virtual identity”, “virtual personality”, “virtual person”, “virtual persona”, “virtual character” and the like. Sometimes these terms may have different meanings and even relate to different objects. In what follows, I shall distinguish between “virtual identity” and “virtual personality” (VP). Although identity and personality are often uses as synonyms, it could be useful to draw a distinction (albeit a rather artificial one) between them. Identity is a derivate from identification and suggests that a subject identifies himself with an object or with some set of qualities. Personality, on the contrary, fixes more on the content of the entity that is perceived as having qualities of the subject – whether by the subject himself or from the outside. Here identification is possible but not necessary. In some cases, there can be a personality without identification – for examples, a virtual character created for attaining some special aim or a computer programme simulating a human person. Both have personal traits but neither is an object of identification for their originators. Since I am more interested in studying the construction of the virtual selves and their (often ambivalent) relationships to the “real selves” than in the process of identification, then the term “personality” (or “personal identity”) seems to fit better for my purposes than that of “identity”. Therefore, I shall use “virtual identity” and “virtual personality” as synonyms in the context where the difference between these terms is unimportant and as different terms when either identification or content are emphasized.

Both users and researchers of electronic communications have paid attention to the following peculiarities of virtual personality:

1. Disembodiment or incorporeality, the reduction of the personality to its semiotic manifestations (i.e. to texts in the broadest sense);
2. Anonymity, or at least, the possibility of such (cf. popular aphorism from a newspaper caricature “On the Internet, nobody knows that you are a dog”); or semiotically speaking, the arbitrary connection between the real or “off-line” identities; 
3. Freedom of providing virtual identity with any set of characteristics (i.e. extended possibilities of identification usually impossible in real life);
4. Multiplicity, the possibility of maintaining a number of different virtual identities simultaneously or successively;
5. Automation, the possibility of simulating activity of virtual identity fully or in part by using computer programmes (this links virtual personality to the concept of artificial intelligence).

The phenomenon of virtual identity has been described with reference to such subdomains of electronic communications as MUDs (Turkle 996), Usenet (Donath 1999), IRC, chat rooms (Cherny 1999), online forums, guest books, virtual worlds, and personal homepages (Cheung 2000; Palmer 2002). The notion of virtual identity is closely tied to the concept of virtual community where the interaction of virtualized persons takes place (Hillis 1999; Rheingold 1993). On the other hand, the events in the virtual environment can affectthe real life of the interacting participators in many ways, sometimes positively and sometimes oppressively or even devastatingly. This has been reflected in research literature (Dibbel 1996; Turkle 1996) as well as in fiction and films.

The theoretical framework of discussions about VP has usually included references to postmodernism and poststructuralism as trends of thought positing the concep of identity that, contrary to the “old”, modernist, essentialist view, is depicted as decentred, multiple, fluid, and based on discursive practices provided by society and culture rather than on intrinsic personal “traits”. The study of “identity in cyberspace” (Bell 2001) has considered some of such discourses, thought of as the “axes” or constructing principles of VP creation. These include race (Kolko, Nakamura, and Rodman 1999), gender (Harcourt 1999; O'Farrell and Vallone 1999; Green and Adam 2001), sexuality(Branwyn 2000;Bright 1992;Wolmark 1999) and class (Green and Adam 2001; Kroker and Weinstein 1994).

Although the literature on virtual identity is rather extensive, the possibilities for research into and experimentation with virtual identities are far from being exhausted. My research contributes to the study of the virtual self both on a theoretical level and by introducing new material.

First, the effects of electronic communications on the concept of self have been studied mainly from the psychological or sociological perspectives. I approach these issues rather from a philosophical perspective and locate the problem of virtual identity in a broader context of thinking about the selfhood. I shall start with a review of various concepts of the self, found in psychological and philosophical literature. Then I shall discuss how the self can be represented, and what is specific in digital self-representation in comparison with traditional media. I shall also propose a general theory of virtual personality as a creative form.

Second, virtual identity has been studied mainly in role-playing environments such as MUDs and other text-based interactive media such as chats and online forums while more recent forms of online activity such as building up personal homepages or weblogging has received less attention. Therefore, virtual identity has been mostly considered as a process and not as a product. I shall focus on WWW-based virtual personalities and discuss their constituent elements, principles of construction, various forms and functions.

Third, most research on virtual identities has been based on the material of Anglo-American cyberculture. The underlying idea that virtual identity is a universal phenomenon and its characteristics are the same regardless of cultural differences is disputable. I shall discuss the specificity of Russian cyberculture in this respect and give some examples of successfully created virtual personalities. I shall also describe and analyse some online projects experimenting personal identity in general.

A brief note on methodology. The representation of the self on the internet has usually been interpreted with reference to post-modernist theory. However, post-modernism is not a ‘unit-idea’ (a basic term for the history of ideas introduced by Arthur Lovejoy) but rather a combination of ideas that can be found in different systems in different times. For example, the view of the self as an aggregate can be found in various mystical and occult teachings that regard the self as a many-layered structure consisting from a number of “bodies”, and the emphasis on the decentralization and fluidity in such teachings as Buddhism. Therefore, there is no need to label as post-modernist all cases where the self is perceived as a heterogeneous or unstable entity. The fact that different systems do share some ideas does not mean that they are identical in other respects. Post-modernist connotations are not always applicable and sometimes only obscure the understanding of particular phenomena by placing them in the improper context of ready ideas. Moreover, postmodernism is usually perceived as a description of a certain state of affairs rather than a way of thinking about any state of affairs. The lack of differentiation between these two aspects leads up to naturalization of thought. In this respect, postmodernism exemplifies ontologizing thinking, that is, to use Heidegger’s expression, thinking which does not think. I suggest that a certain way of thinking can be useful in some situations and useless in others. In any case, I believe that there is always more than one possible way of thinking about any phenomena, including postmodernism itself.

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